We study Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) in settings where multiple labelers may strategically misreport feedback to steer the learned policy toward their own preferences. We show that existing RLHF algorithms, including recent pluralistic methods, are not strategyproof, and that even a single strategic labeler can cause arbitrarily large misalignment with social welfare. Moreover, we prove that, in the worst case, any strategyproof RLHF algorithm must perform k-times worse than the optimal policy, where k is the number of labelers. This suggests a fundamental trade-off between incentive alignment (ensuring labelers report truthfully) and policy alignment (maximizing social welfare). To address this, we propose the Pessimistic Median of MLEs algorithm, which, under appropriate policy coverage assumptions, is approximately strategyproof and converges to the optimal policy as the number of labelers and samples increases. Our results apply to both contextual bandits and Markov decision processes.

A panel satisfies descriptive representation when its composition reflects the population. We examine the role of descriptive representation in collective decision making through an optimization lens, asking whether representative panels make decisions that maximize social welfare for the underlying population. Our main results suggest that, in general, representation with respect to intersections of two or more features guarantees higher social welfare than that achieved by the status quo of proportionally representing individual features. Moreover, an analysis of real data suggests that representation with respect to pairs of features is feasible in practice. These results have significant implications for the design of citizens' assemblies, which are gaining prominence in AI governance.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has emerged as a powerful framework for modeling autonomous agents that independently optimize their individual objectives. However, in mixed-motive MARL environments, rational self-interested behaviors often lead to collectively suboptimal outcomes situations commonly referred to as social dilemmas. A key challenge in addressing social dilemmas lies in accurately quantifying and representing them in a numerical form that captures how self-interested agent behaviors impact social welfare. To address this challenge, externalities in the economic concept is adopted and extended to denote the unaccounted-for impact of one agent's actions on others, as a means to rigorously quantify social dilemmas. Based on this measurement, a novel method, Learning Optimal Pigovian Tax (LOPT) is proposed. Inspired by Pigovian taxes, which are designed to internalize externalities by imposing cost on negative societal impacts, LOPT employs an auxiliary tax agent that learns an optimal Pigovian tax policy to reshape individual rewards aligned with social welfare, thereby promoting agent coordination and mitigating social dilemmas. We support LOPT with theoretical analysis and validate it on standard MARL benchmarks, including Escape Room and Cleanup. Results show that by effectively internalizing externalities that quantify social dilemmas, LOPT aligns individual objectives with collective goals, significantly improving social welfare over state-of-the-art baselines.

We initiate the study of multidimensional Bayesian utility maximization, focusing on the unit-demand setting where values are i.i.d.

We study Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) in settings where multiple labelers may strategically misreport feedback to steer the learned policy toward their own preferences. We show that existing RLHF algorithms, including recent pluralistic methods, are not strategyproof, and that even a single strategic labeler can cause arbitrarily large misalignment with social welfare. Moreover, we prove that, in the worst case, any strategyproof RLHF algorithm must perform $k$-times worse than the optimal policy, where $k$ is the number of labelers. This suggests a fundamental trade-off between incentive alignment (ensuring labelers report truthfully) and policy alignment (maximizing social welfare). To address this, we propose the Pessimistic Median of MLEs algorithm, which, under appropriate policy coverage assumptions, is approximately strategyproof and converges to the optimal policy as the number of labelers and samples increases. Our results apply to both contextual bandits and Markov decision processes.

As the scale of machine learning models increases, trends such as scaling laws anticipate consistent downstream improvements in predictive accuracy. However, these trends take the perspective of a single model-provider in isolation, while in reality providers often compete with each other for users. In this work, we demonstrate that competition can fundamentally alter the behavior of these scaling trends, even causing overall predictive accuracy across users to be non-monotonic or decreasing with scale. We define a model of competition for classification tasks, and use data representations as a lens for studying the impact of increases in scale. We find many settings where improving data representation quality (as measured by Bayes risk) decreases the overall predictive accuracy across users (i.e., social welfare) for a marketplace of competing model-providers. Our examples range from closed-form formulas in simple settings to simulations with pretrained representations on CIFAR-10. At a conceptual level, our work suggests that favorable scaling trends for individual model-providers need not translate to downstream improvements in social welfare in marketplaces with multiple model providers.

A.1 Background on graph neural networks Many GNN architectures iteratively update node features following a neighborhood aggregation scheme.

Voting systems have a wide range of applications including recommender systems, web search, product design and elections. Limited by the lack of general-purpose analytical tools, it is difficult to hand-engineer desirable voting rules for each use case. For this reason, it is appealing to automatically discover voting rules geared towards each scenario. In this paper, we show that set-input neural network architectures such as Set Transformers, fully-connected graph networks and DeepSets are both theoretically and empirically well-suited for learning voting rules. In particular, we show that these network models can not only mimic a number of existing voting rules to compelling accuracy -- both position-based (such as Plurality and Borda) and comparison-based (such as Kemeny, Copeland and Maximin) -- but also discover near-optimal voting rules that maximize different social welfare functions. Furthermore, the learned voting rules generalize well to different voter utility distributions and election sizes unseen during training.

Public goods games represent insightful settings for studying incentives for individual agents to make contributions that, while costly for each of them, benefit the wider society. In this work, we adopt the perspective of a central planner with a global view of a network of self-interested agents and the goal of maximizing some desired property in the context of a best-shot public goods game. Existing algorithms for this known NP-complete problem find solutions that are sub-optimal and cannot optimize for criteria other than social welfare. In order to efficiently solve public goods games, our proposed method directly exploits the correspondence between equilibria and the Maximal Independent Set (mIS) structural property of graphs. In particular, we define a Markov Decision Process which incrementally generates an mIS, and adopt a planning method to search for equilibria, outperforming existing methods. Furthermore, we devise a graph imitation learning technique that uses demonstrations of the search to obtain a graph neural network parametrized policy which quickly generalizes to unseen game instances. Our evaluation results show that this policy is able to reach 99.5% of the performance of the planning method while being three orders of magnitude faster to evaluate on the largest graphs tested. The methods presented in this work can be applied to a large class of public goods games of potentially high societal impact and more broadly to other graph combinatorial optimization problems.